












THE HABITATS DIRECTIVE: 
 
A CASE OF CONTESTED EUROPEANIZATION 
 
 













The Webpublications series comprises studies carried out as part of the activities of the WRR. 
Responsibility for the content and views expressed rests with the authors. A list of all 




2 shaping and taking the habitats directive.........................................................................6 
2.1 Habitats: an introduction..............................................................................................6 
2.2 A reconstruction ............................................................................................................7 
2.2.1 1988-1997: ‘permissive consensus’ ...........................................................................7 
2.2.2 1997-2002: Controversy mobilised...........................................................................9 
2.2.3 2002 –today: ‘Making up for the time lost’? ..........................................................10 
3 Diagnosis: what went wrong? ......................................................................................... 12 
3.1 Administrative complexity and mismatch.................................................................. 12 
3.2 Fragmented sectoral expertise .................................................................................... 12 
3.3 Uncertainty and controversy as to interpretation ...................................................... 13 
3.4 Lack of communication and negative  framing .......................................................... 14 
4 A look across the border.................................................................................................. 16 
5 Some lessons (not) learned ............................................................................................ 20 
6 Conclusion .......................................................................................................................24 
 4 
 
1 INTRODUCTION  
The rapid deterioration of flora and fauna in the member states forms a driving force for 
European Union nature policy. The EU’s Wild Birds Directive (79/409/EC) and the Habitats 
Directive (92/43/EC) establish one coherent ecological network, Natura 2000, to conserve 
and protect typical environments, or habitats, for wild flora and fauna and particular species 
of plants and animals. Originally, the Habitats Directive was a relatively technical policy 
dossier. From 1988 to 1992, it was discussed within an ‘epistemic community’ of policy 
experts, scientists and ecologists. This ‘shaping’ phase was characterised by a broad 
‘permissive consensus’ at the national level. The 1994 deadline for national transposition 
passed without political-administrative action or interest - let alone any debate regarding its 
laudable nature conservation objectives. Only in the late 1990s did processes of national 
implementation create political, administrative and societal controversy within the member 
states.  In the Netherlands, it turned out that, notwithstanding active involvement by the 
Dutch government in shaping the Habitats Directive, there was considerable ‘misfit’ between 
the Directive and existing national arrangements. In 1998, an NGO-initiated discussion 
around the protection of the habitat of the korenwolf generated a wave of public and media 
attention. This little hamster on the verge of extinction became a symbol for inadequate 
implementation of EU policies in the Netherlands. Pursued by legal and administrative 
action by interest groups and stakeholders, the Habitats Directive rapidly moved up the 
political and public agenda.   
In retrospective, the issue has served as a catalyst for changes in both policy content and 
‘embedding’ of the EU and its policies in the Netherlands. In terms of policy content, the 
Habitats Directive has initiated concrete changes in Dutch nature conservation, for example 
by activating and mobilising sub-national governments and NGO’s in ‘communities of 
practice’ (Neven and Van Rijn 2004). The directive is also regarded as a key factor in the 
development of a new policy discourse around ‘economy’ and ‘ecology’ (Van der Zouwen and 
Van den Top 2002). For Dutch politics and administration, bad experiences with the 
Habitats directive have served to increase awareness of possible negative implications of EU-
originating laws and policies. Thereby, this case-study has initiated a domestic debate about 
how to deal with increasing Europeanisation and interwovenness of policies and national 
and international actors, a discussion which carries on until today. At the same time, the 
directive is considered by many ‘street-level’ stakeholders as an example of undesired EU 
involvement into matters considered primarily a national or local competence. This negative 
framing has undisputedly contributed to the public ‘ridiculisation’ of the EU and its policies, 
which had its effects in the negative vote for the 2005 constitutional referendum.1  
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The aim of this paper is to analyse processes of domestic politicisation and societal 
embedding around the Habitats Directive in the Netherlands. In section 2, a reconstruction is 
presented of how the Habitats Directive was shaped at the EU-level and how this process 
became ‘embedded’ in Dutch democracy and society. The analysis in section 3 assesses the 
origins of problems of politico-administrative and public uncertainty and perceived problems 
of legitimacy with the Directive in the Netherlands. In sections 4 and 5 it is evaluated, on the 
basis of experiences in other member states, whether and how to prevent and remedy the 
resulting, deeper problems of compliance, legitimacy and acceptance which had their effects 
on to Dutch EU-policy for the years to come.  
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2 SHAPING AND TAKING THE HABITATS DIRECTIVE 
2.1 Habitats: an introduction  
Since the early 1980s, environmental NGO’s such as WWF and Friends of the Earth actively 
lobbied DG Environment for new policies to support the 1979 Wild Birds Directive. The first 
Commission proposal for what became known as the Habitats Directive was issued in 
September 1988.2 After four years of negotiations between government representatives at 
Council level and consultation of the European Parliament, political agreement was reached 
in October 1991, under Dutch EU Council Presidency. 3 There was broad support amongst 
national government delegations for legislation aiming to set and harmonise definitions, 
principles and legal obligations for nature conservation policy. Throughout the process, also 
the European Commission (DG ENV) has been very active in terms of policy initiative, legal 
action and funds management.  
 
The Habitats Directive requires that national governments designate flora and fauna habitats 
within and around ‘special areas of conservation’ and prevent their deterioration by ensuring 
conservation. Annexes to the Directive list the types of habitats (I) and species (II) to be 
protected, to the extent that no measures may be carried out with potentially significant 
consequences and effects upon the ecosystem. The latter provision has become a source of 
rivalry, as it necessitates a continuous weighing of interests between, on the one hand, 
economic, infrastructural and/or societal relevance of ‘measures’ proposed, 4  and, on the 
other hand, nature conservation and species protection. Following interpretation by the 
European Court of Justice, strict conditions apply to proposals for private or public 
intervention in natural habitats to be legally accepted: there should be no other alternatives 
available, urgent reasons for public interest should be made explicit and the damage to 
nature should be physically or financially compensated.  
 
The deadline for legal transposition of the Habitats Directive was June 1994, but no member 
state has met this deadline or that for proposing a set of sites (1998). Pressured by threats of 
legal action by the Commission,5 since 1997, transposition and implementation in the 
member states have gradually been realised. Currently (mid-2006), the national lists of 
designed habitats are reviewed for designation by the European Commission. Final 
designation is expected for 2007.6  Some 12% of the EU’s land cover has been designated as 
sites of community interest. In the near future, plans will have to be developed on how to 
manage these habitats. At the EU level, a revision of the Habitats Directive to incorporate the 




1988 (July) DG 11 (ENV) issues proposal for a directive on habitats and flora/fauna 
1990 First reading European Parliament 
1991 (December) Political agreement Council (Dutch Presidency) 
1992 (Julye) Directive published in the official journal 
1994 (June) Deadline transposition 
2001 NL: Dutch government assigns Habitat areas 
2002 NL: Habitats Directive  transposed into ‘Flora and fauna bill’ (species protection) 
2003 Commission DG ENV agrees upon Habitat areas  
2004 NL: ECJ verdict for late transposition of the Habitats Directive  provisions (C 441/03) 
2005 NL: Habitats Directive  transposed into ‘Nature protection bill’ (habitat sites) 
2006 National lists reviewed by DG ENV 
2007 Designation of sites, EU-level revision of the Directive foreseen 
Table 1: Timeline Habitats directive 92/43/EC 
 
2.2 A reconstruction  
2.2.1 1988-1997: ‘permissive consensus’  
Interestingly, the goals and objectives of the Habitats Directive were initially widely 
supported by all actors involved in its shaping. This includes the majority of national 
government delegations, representatives of the EU institutions (Commission and Parliament) 
as well as ‘green’ NGO’s organised at the EU level (WNF, Friends of the Earth). From the 
beginning, however, national governments did not seem inclined to act upon the legal 
obligations that the Directive set. In the Netherlands, up to 1997, political and administrative 
attention for the implications of the Directive was virtually absent. This is rather remarkable, 
taking into consideration the active role of Dutch negotiators during negotiations on the 
Directive at Council level. From 1988 to 1992, the Dutch government delegation at the EU-
level actively promoted the so-called ‘network approach’, which had been central to national 
nature conservation policy since 1990 (Hoefnagel 2003, 82).  
 
Dutch activism in the field can be understood in the particular domestic context and tradition 
of environmental and nature conservation policy (Van den Bosch 2005). The Netherlands is 
the most densely populated country in EU. Nature and environment objectives have to 
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compete with other potential use and exploitation of the scarce land for purposes of industry, 
housing, infrastructure, agriculture, tourism, water and environment. In addition, a large 
proportion of the country lies below sea level and the Rhine carries pollution from several 
countries within state borders.  Responsibility for national nature policy lies with the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality (LNV) and its department for nature, scenic 
and landscape policies (Directie Natuur). However, the departments of Spatial Planning and 
Environment (VROM) and Transport and Water management (V&W) are also closely 
involved.7 At the local and regional level, the sub-national government layers (provinces, 
municipalities, water boards) are often owner and manager of the land, fields, canals and 
roads which are to be designated and protected. It has been estimated that half of all Dutch 
municipalities are affected by species or habitats conservation related to either the Wild Birds 
or the Habitats Directive, for example by impact upon local designation plans 
(‘bestemmingsplannen’).  Sub-national governments cooperate with government agencies 
such as Staatsbosbeheer and Rijkswaterstaat. Also, private organisations and interest groups, 
both nationally organised (Stichting Natuur en Milieu, LTO, Waddenvereniging, 
Vogelbescherming) and locally (provincial environment federations; Das &Boom) have an 
agenda setting and mobilising role, representing a wealth of interests ((business and 
industry; construction and building companies; forest owners, nature conservationists).  
 
The continuous competition for the use of scarce lands; this fragmented playing field and a 
traditionally consensual policy style explain the particularities of the ‘Dutch approach’ to 
nature and environment policy. This domestic pattern of environmental policy making is 
referred to as ‘negotiated rule making’ and a strive for comprehensive, long-term policy 
planning (Liefferink and Van der Zouwen 2004, 139). The advantage is that much is done in 
terms of consultation of stakeholders during the ‘shaping’ stages, in order to increase support 
for policy outcomes. The downside is that, once negotiated and in place, policy concepts and 
projects are relatively inflexible and rigid.  
In terms of environment and nature policy, the Netherlands thus ranks as a highly regulated 
member state, which explains its activities at the EU-level trying to ‘upload’ national policy 
concepts (a form of ‘regulatory competition’, see Héritier et.al. 1996). Over the years, the 
Dutch government has established a reputation in the EU as a ‘pioneer’ or ‘pace-setter’ 
known for exporting domestic environmental policy solutions to the EU level (Liefferink 
1997, Van der Zouwen and Van Tatenhove, 2002).  
 
The Habitats Directive was no exception. The National Ecological Network (EHS), in which 
nature areas are connected though so-called ecological corridors was promoted during initial 
discussions at the EU level and has inspired the design of the EU-wide network Natura 
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2000. Reaching political agreement on the Directive was a priority for the Netherlands EU 
Council Presidency (1991). The Dutch delegation to the negotiations on the Habitats Directive 
was considered by their counterparts to be ‘very influential’ and ‘powerful’ (Van Rheenen 
et.al., 2005, 46-47).  
 
At the same time, in The Hague, the fact that a new EU Habitats Directive was debated was 
more or less a ‘fait accompli’. There is no evidence for any domestic political interest or 
parliamentary discussions on the Directive. Potential implications - more specifically: the 
two-year deadline for transposition into national legislation – were not at any moment or 
level assessed. This finding should be understood in the ‘depoliticised’ context of EU policy 
making up to the end of the 1990s. The process of shaping the Habitats Directive, as was the 
case with so many other policies, was restricted to a rather exclusive group of ‘green’ experts: 
scientists, nature policy makers and NGO’s. At the time (early 1990s), provinces and 
municipalities were still largely unaware of the legal and administrative impact and 
requirements emanating from EU policy - let alone that EU policy was of concern to political 
parties or (groups of) citizens were aware of its implications. Experts claim that even the 
judiciary was not yet very knowledgeable as to the implications of ‘direct effect’ of EU 
directives, judged by the way the directive was (mis-)interpreted in the first court cases 
related to its obligations.  
 
2.2.2 1997-2002: Controversy mobilised 
In 1998, the Dutch government was condemned by the European Court of Justice for failing 
to assign sufficient sites as special conservation zones under the Birds Directive (C-3/96). 
This court case acted as a wake-up call for political and administrative actors. It turned out 
only then that there was considerable misfit between the Habitats Directive and existing 
policies and arrangements - for example in the field of species protection, a concept much 
more central to the Directive than to national nature policy (Kuindersma et.al. 2004, 57).  In 
the same year, at the national level, a first court case was instigated by Das en Boom for the 
imminent extinction of a particular hamster species (Cricetus cricetus) listed in the annex to 
the Directive. Nationally and locally organised ‘green’ NGO’s and interest groups 
(Waddenvereniging; Vogelbescherming; provincial environment federations and ad-hoc local 
groups) initiated legal and administrative procedures against alleged incorrect and late 
implementation of the Habitats Directive and misfit between new or proposed spatial plans 
or infrastructural interventions and its requirements.  
 
NGO’s have been particularly closely involved in the Habitats Directive. At the EU level, 
NGO’s had a significant influence on the drafting of the Directive through input of scientific 
 10 
expertise in expert groups and regular consultations with the Commission. Representatives of 
NGO’s continue to be involved in monitoring and steering the implementation process, for 
example in the EU Habitats Committee of DG Environment and, at the national level, in 
various steering groups in close consultation with governments of the member states.  
These organisations therefore claim to have a broad public base for their actions: in the 
Netherlands, the environmental and nature NGO’s with over 500 members represent some 4 
million contributors - one in four Dutch citizens. They can also benefit from considerable 
funds for financing expensive and long legal and administrative procedures in order to 
challenge spatial interventions with potential negative effects on flora and fauna. In 2004, 
after five years of legal battle, the European Court of Justice ruled upon a prejudicial question 
of the Raad van State regarding the request of two NGOs (Waddenvereniging and 
Vogelbescherming) that mechanical cockle fishing in Zeeland would fall under the scope of 
article 6 of the Habitats Directive (C-127/02). 
 
It should also be noted that the legal channel is relatively accessible in the Netherlands and 
that the time span for rulings is short, for example compared to Belgium.  The way to court is 
easily found by organisations and individuals and projects in progress may still be delayed or 
cancelled, instead of stakeholders having to fight against ‘accomplished facts’.  Apart from 
legal actions, however, also many procedures have been initiated at the administrative level 
by small, local groups of concerned citizens, driven either by green ideology or by ‘not in my 
backyard’-concerns.  
 
2.2.3 2002 –today: ‘Making up for the time lost’? 
In December 2002, the Commission referred the Netherlands to the Court of Justice due to 
alleged shortcomings to implement the Habitats Directive. The method of interpretation of 
its provisions (to implement by means of spatial administrative instruments (Planologische 
KernBeslissingen) was ruled legally incorrect.  Obviously, this was a painful finding for the 
Dutch government, considering that national spatial concepts had laid at the basis of the 
Directive. Within the government administration and amongst responsible politicians, the 
Habitats Directive became widely known as a ‘disaster dossier’. Serious political and 
administrative efforts for transposition and implementation proved cumbersome and time-
consuming. Discussion on transposition of the provisions of the Directive into the Nature 
Conservation Bill (NBw 1998) took 5 years of debates for the bill to be finalised in parliament. 
The main concern was the division of competences between the central government and the 
provinces: who should be responsible for what?  This controversy is illustrated by the fact 
that the central government signed a covenant with the provinces about nature conservation 
policy in which the Habitats Directive is not mentioned (Van der Zouwen and Tatenhove 
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2002, 14). At the same time, the designation of habitat sites was taken seriously. In May 
2003, the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Fisheries (LNV) was the first member state 
government to submit a list of 141 habitats (730.000 hectare) to the Commission. This fore-
runner action was important to the Commission, as now other member states could be 
convinced to act similarly.  
The Habitats requirements are currently the subject of an astonishing pile of guidelines and 
policy briefs - an active communication and information policy in which the responsible 
ministry LNV has taken the lead. However, up till now, problems remain when it comes to 
‘organisational qualities’: transfer of knowledge, communications and discussion on 
financing site management (IBO 2003, 16). This is clear at the regional and local level, where 
the subject matter continues to mobilise societal actions and debates, a very recent example 
being the case of deepening the Westerschelde.8  
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3 DIAGNOSIS: WHAT WENT WRONG? 
This section discusses four categories of causes and explanations for the serious problems 
experienced with the Habitats Directive in the Netherlands. 
 
3.1 Administrative complexity and mismatch  
To begin with, many problems experienced with the Habitats directive in the Netherlands can 
be explained by reference to specific politico-administrative factors. Again, (EU) policy 
making in the Dutch ‘polder model’ is a case of multi-level and multi-actor governance, prone 
to heavy political-administrative co-ordination. What is more, the legal and policy framework 
of nature conservation policy – species protection in particular - is judged by experts and 
academics as extremely complex (Kistenkas & Kuindersma 2004, 17).  The horizontal and 
vertical fragmentation of decision-making explains the problems and delays for integrating 
the Directive into sectoral legislation and land use planning procedures (Hirsch Ballin and 
Senden 2005: 67).  
 
A related problem is continuing administrative mismatch between the EU and the national 
level. In the Netherlands, nature and environment policy are administratively and legally 
separated. This conflicts with the situation in the EU, where the Commission’s DG 
environment as well as numerous working groups under the Environment Council are 
primarily responsible for nature conservation policy. This implies that the first responsible 
ministry for nature policy making in The Hague, the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature policy 
and Food Quality,9 needs to co-operate with the environment and spatial planning ministry 
for contacts with the EU field - not in the least to deliver Dutch positions in the Brussels 
arena of the Environment Council, where the Habitats Directive and successive legislation is 
decided. 
 
3.2 Fragmented sectoral expertise  
Both within the administration and ‘on the ground’, knowledge of legal consequences of 
policies; insights in political challenges in shaping and taking as well as expertise as regards 
ecological objectives and spatial planning are heavily dispersed. This problem of 
‘sectoralisation’ of expertise and knowledge and resulting fragmentation of policy making 
plays a role both at the EU-level and at the national level. Experts within ‘scientific 
communities’ are to a large extent responsible for the shaping of nature policy. Subsequent 
management and enforcement is a task for other groups of stakeholders.   
 
Late and incorrect implementation is largely due to insufficient political and administrative 
attention for EU (nature) policy in general. In the early 1990s, at the central government, 
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knowledge about what happened at the EU level and how to deal with the shaping and taking 
of EU legislation was still largely limited to a small circle of insiders: the departmental 
international relations divisions and the EU department within the Foreign Affairs Ministry.  
Certainly, the Dutch government delegation at the EU level was widely considered active and 
particularly knowledgeable negotiators, bringing considerable scientific expertise to the 
negotiating table (Van Rheenen 2005, 49). However, as there was no regular transfer of 
knowledge and experiences to policy makers concerned with ‘national’ policy domains, only a 
few policy makers at the departments of Nature, Environment and Spatial Planning realised 
the effects of the Habitats Directive. In the words of one respondent: ‘it took until 1998 before 
realisation dawned at the Ministry that an EU directive has actually legal status’.  
Dominance of a small group of expert officials within the government’s Nature department 
has made that ‘the process of weighing different interests at stake has not, or only late stage, 
been initiated’ (SER, 2006, 6). In the words of another respondent: ‘when it was possible, no-
one cared’, then a long learning curve has materialised until today’. This ‘verkokering’ has 
thereby ultimately, contributed to the negative framing of the directive (see below). 
 
As transposition of the provisions of the Habitats Directive took so long, a process of gradual 
‘legalisation’ of the policy making process took place (‘juridisering van de besluitvorming’; 
Verschuuren and Van Wijmen 2002). NGO’s and interest groups, closely involved in the 
shaping of the Directive realised the potential for enforcing nature policy at the level of the 
member states. National implementation was being enforced through court cases (SER 2006, 
38). According to one respondent, the responsible legal institution (Raad van State / afd. 
Bestuursrechtspraak) has also experienced a steep learning curve when it comes to assessing 
the potential effects and impact of EU-originated legislation. Up until the 1990s, the potential 
direct effect of EU law was not sufficiently taken into consideration –the Court condemnation 
in 1998 constituted a breaking point.  
 
3.3 Uncertainty and controversy as to interpretation  
According to some analysts, the Habitats Directive is a piece of legislation with ‘low 
ambiguity’ - i.e. it sets out in clear terms what is to be achieved and when (Laffan and 
O’Mahoney 2004, 4). However, in practice, in the member states, there has been substantive 
controversy over the interpretation of its different provisions. Again, green policy experts 
have shaped the Habitats Directive, but its effects are to be applied and managed at ‘street-
level’ by ecologists and biologists - with differing perspectives on its potential biological and 
ecological effects. The Habitats Directive is sometimes called ‘static’ and ‘conservative’ (IBO 




Then, there was uncertainty as to the legal interpretation as to how to interpret definitions 
and key notions of the directive (‘significant effects’; ‘appropriate measures’, ‘urgent reasons’, 
‘plans or projects’) and their implications. Although NGO’s had been very active in shaping 
the Directive, other stakeholders were only confronted with its provisions after the deadline 
for transposition. This led to the Directive being perceived as a threat to existing practices. 
Many farmers and forest owners in particular considered the requirements of the Habitats 
Directive as quite restrictive and static. The governments of the member states initially did 
little to ease this pain. Only after the implementation date had been expired, consultation 
processes were initiated. For example, only by persuasion with financial ‘carrots’, such as the 
EU-wide funding programmes LIFE, could regional actors in Denmark be convinced of 
supporting the Directive (Van Rheenen et.al. 2005, 47).  
 
In addition, the European Commission is accused of only increasing miscommunication and 
uncertainty. The Commission thereby points at the member states, which would be 
responsible for implementation of Community law. But governments and NGO’s complain 
that Individual advice requests from member states to the Commission are not made public. 
There can thus be no question of a potential ‘learning effect’ between member states and the 
development of best practices in implementation (Neven and Kistenkast 2003, 36). 
 
3.4 Lack of communication and negative  framing 
Discussion on the Habitats Directive has for a long time been restricted to a small number of 
stakeholders and framed as a technical policy debate.  Amongst these stakeholders 
(government officials and policy makers, green NGO’s and ecologists) the directive was little 
controversial. The policy debate, in which NGO’s played an important pusher role directed at 
the European Commission, was primarily focused on how to designate and finance EU-wide 
ecological structures.  The consequences for site management and species protection ‘on the 
ground’ were not taken into consideration. The consequences of the directive were not 
discussed with stakeholders at the regional and local levels and the ‘multi-level’ character of 
nature policy was for long underestimated (Van der Zouwen and Van Tatenhove 2002, 7). 
 
With the societal actions described since the 1998s, the debate spread to the public sphere. 
Other stakeholders – private sector; sub-national governments and NGO’s – ‘awoke’ as to the 
consequences of the issue. In particular the korenwolf- case instigated a wave of public and 
media attention. Against those citizens with warm feelings for nature conservation, 
represented by the NGO’s as described in the above, others felt more directly negatively 
threatened by the otherwise laudable objectives of ecological preservation as building 
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projects and infrastructural measures were delayed and uncertainty entailed considerable 
administrative and legal costs for the private sector. Thereby, the issue touched upon the 
dilemma between ‘ ecology’ and ‘ economy’ as essentially contrasting value sets. 
 
There are two potential explanations why the subject matter of the Habitats Directive is so 
appealing. First, the potential of the issue of nature and species conservation to be 
graphically displayed, for example by using colour maps of the country and the location of 
designated sites (see annex) is obviously very appealing to policy makers and politicians. The 
impact of policy can thus easily be illustrated.  
Second, it is also rather easy to paint an appealing picture of ‘cute’ animals being endangered 
by human intervention, or, in contrast, of the waste of financial resources spent on their 
preservation of a handful of animals.  Both have been the focus of media contribution across 
the spectrum: from popular media (Telegraaf) up to serious television shows (Buitenhof), 
and a serious number of parliamentary questions. This is the context by which, in the 
Netherlands, the korenwolf gained national fame and so did zeggekorfslak and the 
rugstreeppad.  
 
The slogans ‘Red de Korenwolf’ (1998) and  ‘Nederland op slot’  (2002) are prominent 
examples of this rather provocative framing by both sides of the spectrum. This has also 
contributed to the rapid ‘ridiculisation’ of the Habitats Directive. This is rather striking, 
taking into consideration the broad consensus and downright support amongst member state 
governments for the Habitats directive in 1992. Aggravated by lack of information and 
communication by these same governments, however, the public image of this issue has 
become that of downright irritation and (perhaps) fear for meddling of Brussels technocrats 
in those matters concerned of predominantly local and regional concern. In 2003, Belgian 
MEP Dirk Sterckx explicitly related to these concerns when he stated in a speech to his 
Flemish constituency that ‘we should see that the protection of biodiversity is not used as an 




4 A LOOK ACROSS THE BORDER  
In the case of the Habitats Directive, instead of political controversy on its goals and 
objectives, it seems thus rather the process of embedding – instead of policy contents - which 
constitute the main source of uncertainty and legitimacy problems. This brings up the 
question to what extent these or related challenges have been experienced in other member 
states; if so, how these have been remedied and, finally: whether these cases learn us if and 
how problems of uncertainty, embedding and legitimacy in the Netherlands could have been 
prevented (for example by means of a more careful ‘embedding’ policy from the side of the 
national government).  
 
A look across the border shows that virtually all member states have experienced delays or 
problems with implementation and application of the Habitats Directive. But problem 
causes, diagnoses and remedies differ due to national differences in scale and character of 
nature policies and politico-administrative particularities (Hirsch Ballin & Senden, 2005, 67). 
For example, as to state-specific particularities as to the contents, the case of Finland stands 
out. Here, the Habitats Directive and more specifically the annexes had to be supplemented 
with references to arctic species and habitats. Once the list of sites was proposed by the 
government, some 1250 appeals of ca. 5000 appellants (site owners and managers as well as 
nature organisations) were received by the Supreme Administrative Court for either to 
withdraw or add sites to the list.  
On 11 September 2001, the Court found that France had not put forward enough sites for 
the protection of species and habitats mentioned in the EU’s Habitats Directive (case C-
220/99).Site proposals are still insufficient for dozens of habitats and species: types of forests 
and peatlands, as well as certain fish and plant species. In France, there have been many 
societal protests against the designation of sites, in which parliament was scarcely involved as 
this was done by means of Decree, accounted for the delay in implementation. Note that, in 
the Netherlands, although the implementation process was particularly cumbersome, site 
designation was particularly successful, to the extent that the Dutch regained their fore-
runner position in the EU.  
Explanations for national problems have been found in differing nature conservation 
traditions between the member states. Perhaps rather paradoxically, as environment and 
nature policy was less developed in member states in the South and East of the EU, there was 
no question of misfit and new EU-originating provisions could relatively easy be transposed. 
However, here the assessment of projects turns out to be problematic. In January 2005, the 
Commission decided to refer Spain to the Court for failure to assess the effects of sand 
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extraction and beach regeneration along the Mediterranean coast. The sites in question host 
endangered species such as the sea turtle and are proposed as Natura 2000 sites under the 
Habitats Directive. According to the Commision, Spanish authorities have failed to assess the 
effects of the projects concerned on these sites, violating the Habitats Directive as well as the 
Environment Impact Assessment Directive. Through a similar virtual lack of existing nature 
policy, the new member states score relatively well in this respect. On the other hand, 
problems have been related to economic performance of regions and member states. 
Economic laggards have problems with the obligation to mobilise a high administrative 
capacity in order to respect the Directives’ provisions.  
 
A second set of problem diagnoses is related to particular constitutional or administrative 
structures. In federal member states, such as Germany, Austria, Italy  and Belgium, 
implementation delays have been due to competing competences and conflict between 
different government  layers which point at each other when it comes to taking responsibility 
for implementation and management of nature policies. As described in the above, in the 
Netherlands, similar debates have dominated the parliamentary discussions on the 
distribution of competencies between sub-national governments and the central level. NL 
was finally condemned by ECJ for non compliance as formal process was held up by length of 
internal legislative process. This delay, combined with strict interpretation and lack of 
integration with spatial planning policies at the sub-national level accounted for the Habitast 
Directive held responsible for obstructing / frustrating planned infrastructural works.  
 
Also differing ‘embedding’ practices account for variation. In the United Kingdom and 
Sweden, consistent with the emergence of the ‘governance’ paradigm, rather positive 
experiences with public participation and stakeholder involvement have been developed with 
a pro-active information policy from the agencies responsible for implementation (‘English 
Nature, RSPB’). It seems also that in the UK, there is relatively more attention for bottom-up 
processes and social dynamics, for example by informal contacts, regular consultation and 
dialogue with concerned citizens and stakeholders (Neven et.al. 2005: 35, Jordan & Fairbrass 
2002). In Sweden, an intermediairy depoliticised organisation ensures flexibility to deal with 
lack of clarity and uncertainty and bridge-building between policymakers. This orchestrates 
policy implementation as an iterative process (learning) which creates support (Alterra, 110).  
 
The case of the UK is often quoted in analyses of all that went wrong with the Habitats 
Directive in the Netherlands. On the one hand, the long-standing Dutch tradition of regular 
consultation between stakeholders explained inflexibility and thereby implementation delays. 
But analysts point at a changing Dutch administrative culture moving away from ‘taking care 
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of’ towards ‘taking care’(Hermans et.al. 2004). The case of the cockle fisheries in the Wadden 
sea is a successful example of these emerging bottom-up practices, which acknowledge 
expertise and interdependence. The process of process of integrating Natura 2000 
requirements into local planning (Neven and Van Rijn 2003) has been delegated to the level 




5 SOME LESSONS (NOT) LEARNED  
In many member states, the Habitats Directive still features prominently in lists of 
cumbersome EU interventions in the field of environment and nature policy. As such, it is 
preceded by the Wild Birds Directive, which dates back to 1979 and has experienced similar 
implementation delays, and is followed by the struggle around implementation of the Nitrate 
Directive (91/676/EC) and more recently the Air Quality Directive. There are two striking 
similarities in these cases. First, in all cases, the Dutch government was particularly active 
during the ‘shaping’ process at the EU level. Second, potential consequences at the national 
level were realised in a rather late stage (Rood et.al. 2005, SER 2006). Paradoxically, a fore-
runner position in the negotiations may thus lead to a kind of ‘false confidence’ within the 
national government in the alleged degree of fit with existing arrangements. This has led to 
the emergence of a ‘credibility gap’ for the Dutch government when it comes to delivering 
results in terms of EU legislation (Van den Top en Van der Zouwen 2000). 
Over time, a number of remedies have been suggested to prevent and fix these and related 
implementation problems in the field of environmental and nature policy (see for example 
Liefferink and Van der Zouwen 2004, SER 2006). Overseeing the analysis in the above, it is 
perhaps not surprising that the majority of these solutions proposed focus on the politico-
administrative dimension.  
 
To begin with, there is a consistent call for active input into the EU policy-making process in 
the ‘shaping’ phases, for more political steering as to the priorities and for applying regular 
impact assessments on new EU policy proposals. As a small member state, the Netherlands is 
and will remain dependent on international rules and legislation in the field of nature 
conservation and environment. A strategy of ‘taking the lead’, by actively  initiating policies 
on the basis of national experiences and ‘best practices’ could consequently prevent surprises 
in the ‘ taking’  phases of EU legislation (Voermans and Steunenberg 2005, Clingendael 
2005, see also Raad van State 2005 and SER 2006). The Netherlands has a reputation for 
pioneering in the field. However, living up to these expectations should not lead to suprises 
once policies have to be implemented on the ground. In the past few years, therefore, active 
input of the Dutch government delegation at Council level is directed at including explicit 
allowances in the text of individual directives to implement by means of voluntary 
agreements (Liefferink and Van der Zouwen 2004).  
 
Second, a lesson learned from the case of the Habitats Directive is that currently, once 
difficulties in implementation are expected, generally, recognition is actively sought, for 
example by contacting the European Commission. However, in the field of nature policy, 
there is still an inherent conflict between the EU’s and the domestic policy style. If 
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implementation is too little and too late, problems tend to be tough as a result of the 
relatively rigid tradition of long-term comprehensive strategies in the field of environmental 
policy and a consensual policy culture in the Netherlands, which makes policies agreed 
difficult to change (Liefferink and van der Zouwen, 2004, 149).  
 
Third, a political ‘reality check’ on the European ambitions of the Dutch government is widely 
recommended. If it is decided that a particular policy idea merits full political and 
administrative attention and capacity to be initiated or supported, follow-up throughout the 
policy chain should be better ensured than when its initiation was in the hands of a small 
policy-making elite. In this respect, the Habitats Directive was a bad example of sectoral, or 
even: technical legislation in the field of ecology, with nonetheless large implications for 
other stakeholders in spatial planning and nature management. The fact that these 
consequences went for long unnoticed has contributed to the politico-administrative 
uncertainty and ultimately, also to the negative framing of the issue.  
In this process of initiating and mobilising a national debate on (the impact of) international 
and EU-level policy proposals, as well as in considering and differentiating between 
potentially conflicting values and interests lies a central task for the national government. 
The choices and alternatives are insufficiently depicted and visualised (SER 2006, 7). the 
same time, as intermediate between sub- and supra national governments and ‘taker’ and 
‘shaper’ of EU legislation (Hoefnagel 2002, 88), it is clear that the national government has a 
difficult position in this respect.  
 
Then, much has been said about the presumed lack of timely, consistent and pro-active 
communication about the effects of the Habitats Directive, both from the side of the 
government as from the side of the European Commisison. The latter is accused of having 
taken rather long to act upon its responsibilities as ‘guardian of the treaties’. The first of a 
large number of time-consuming court cases were only initiated at the end of the 1990s. This 
has increased uncertainties for sub-national governments, site owners and private parties 
which and to what extent measures and projects would fall under the range of the directive. 
At the same time, the national government would have only increased this uncertainty by not 
communicating and informing stakeholders on how to deal with its implications ‘on the 
ground’. This void was ultimately filled with individual mobilising actions by NGO’s and 
groups of engaged citizens, which accounted for the wake-up call referred to in the above.  
 
It should be stressed that overseeing the problems experienced with the Habitats Directive, 
time has done a lot in this respect. In the past decade awareness of EU policies and their 
implications has spread gradually throughout the central government. Representatives of 
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provinces and municipalities are now very active in influencing the making and taking of new 
EU policies both in Brussels and in the capitals. The experiences with the Habitats Directive 
have in this respect effectively contributed as a catalyst. When it comes to societal side of the 
discussions, in the Netherlands and in other member states, such as the UK, the Birds and 
Habitats Directives were the first instances of gradual Europeanization of a formerly national 
policy area, that of nature policy, which have done a lot in terms of societal mobilisation. 
Indirectly, the Habitats Directive has generated politicisation of pressure and interest groups 
and the creation of new political opportunity structures which have helped to ‘embed’ 
European nature rules into the national and sub-national policy context (Jordan 2002, 149). 
On the one hand, in terms of the broad tension between ‘ecology’ and ‘economy’, recent 
studies emphasize how the latter still is the dominant value-frame. As a result of the 
prominence and dominance of provinces and municipalities in decision-making, groups of 
interested and/or concerned citizens still lack the administrative power to effectively 
influence the results of politico-administrative decision making (Van den Bosch 2005).  
 
On the other hand, both at the EU level and within member states, there is now much more 
attention for processes of multi-level and multi-actor ‘governance’ and the potential for 
trans-national interest coalitions in influencing policy processes. As a result of the 
devastating experiences with the Habitats Directive, international best-practices of bottom-
up implementation have been ‘learned’ and are now gradually applied in the Netherlands. In 
local experiences, there is now a different discourse and playing rules, from top-down 
towards interaction, integration and embedding. Improving the image of Habitats Directive 
will have to be sought in social justification and legitimisation of the choice upon which 
ideological foundation the nature policy should be implemented by deliberation with 
stakeholders in particular at a regional level. It has also been argued that the Habitats 
Directive has actually confronted the national government with its more general search for a 
way to deal with decentralised agencies and governance practices. Currently, there is a 
tension between, on the one hand, a prevailing trend of ‘steering at a distance’, which implies 
a rather loose stance of the national government and regional and local actors are encouraged 
to take the lead. This obviously creates a different dynamics as to the question how to create 
social support and to ensure democratic legitimacy for policies. On the other hand, national 
government has a prime responsibility as the gate keeper for international policy making and 





Both within the small insiders’ circle of green experts and at the political level within the 
member states, the 1988 Commission proposal to lay down principles of nature conservation 
policy in the EU’s member states in a binding directive were not contentious at all. Actions in 
the ‘shaping’ and ‘taking’ phases of the Habitats Directive therefore focused on ‘how’-
questions, concerned with transposition, implementation, administration and enforcement of 
its provisions. This process of administrative dealings in the years after 1992 probably 
constituted a key source of uncertainty and legitimacy problems in the member states. 
Considering the Dutch reputation in the EU (an active leader regarding environmental 
policy) the appearance of serious policy misfit came as a complete surprise for Dutch policy 
makers.  Due to a long prevailing ‘permissive consensus’ surrounding the EU in the 
Netherlands, national politics and administration long suffered from a striking lack of 
awareness of the possible effects and consequences of EU policies agreed upon in Brussels.  
In combination with the (false) belief that policy and institutional adaptation to the Directive 
would not be necessary, the government did not actively take up its task of informing and 
communicating stakeholders about the issue of the Habitat Directive. For those groups of 
stakeholders not involved in the ‘shaping’ stages - i.e. those outside the small circle of 
‘insiders’ (green NGOs and experts at central government level) - the final Directive was a 
particularly nasty surprise. High administrative uncertainly over the issue increased 
uncertainty at street level - a process which ultimately resulted in much legal and 
administrative upheaval. The bad example of the Habitats Directive in the end contributed to 
a particularly negative framing of EU related requirements in general, a political mood which 
has been picked up by the general public and reflected in the 2005 referendum campaign on 
the Constitutional Treaty. It can therefore be safely concluded that the effects of the Habitats 
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1 See for example ‘Fijnstof is in Dordt de nieuwe korenwolf’, in: De Volkskrant, 28 april 2005.  
2 COM (88)381. An amended proposal was issued in 1990 (COM (90)59). The naming came from the fact that the 
proposals summed up not only species but also types of habitats. 
3 OJ L206 22.07.1992, p. 7-50 
4 The European Court of Justice has in successive case law gradually extended the scope of ‘measures’ to include 
existing or long-planned activities, projects and plans. 
5 Art 226 EC gives the Commission powers to take legal action against a member state that is not respecting legal 
obligations. Where the Court of Justice finds proof of infringement, the offending Member State is required to 
take necessary measures. Art 228 EC gives the Commission powers to act against a member state that does not 
comply with a judgement of the Court. It may ask the Court to impose a financial penalty on the Member State 
concerned. 
6 Over 87% of these areas also fall under the scope of the Wild Birds Directive. 
7 Note that at the EU-level, nature conservation is part of environmental policy, shaped by the Commission’s DG 
Environment and set in the Environment Council. This administrative mismatch between the national and 
the EU level constitutes a source of co-ordination problems. 
8 In order to conserve natural values in this particular habitat, some 600 hectare of farmland in Zeeland will have 
to be expropriated, a drastic measure which has initiated a storm of protests. See for example parliamentary 
questions d.d. 19 Mei 2006, ‘onvrijwillige onteigening a.g.v ontpoldering Westerschelde’. 
9 It has been argued that the traditionally strong ties of the Ministry of LNV with agricultural interests has not 
facilitated the ‘mind shift’ to nature policy (Hoefnagel 2002, 91). 
